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Abstract: The economic, social and political reasons leading to intervention by 
governments in the electricity industry, and the intervention mechanisms adopted, are 
examined. The problems with intervention by regulation are considered. New 
Zealand legislation affecting the electricity industry from 1865 to the present is 
reviewed. The radical restructuring of the industry that has resulted from the 
Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998 is examined. The experiences of some other 
jurisdictions, principally the United States of America and Australia are noted. The 
emphasis in recent years on fostering competition in generation and retailing has been 
based on the application of economic concepts, and appears likely to have a beneficial 
outcome in New Zealand. It is concluded that, in the absence of government 
ownership, regulation of the regional natural monopoly distribution markets in New 
Zealand is essential, but that an optimal mechanism to achieve this remains to be 
identified. The transmission market remains under government ownership, but it is 
concluded that this does not remove possible concerns about how this market is 
operated. 
Word Length: The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, 
bibliography and annexures) comprises approximately 12,000 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
This paper addresses the question of why and how governments intervene in the 
markets for the production, transmission or supply of electricity, and how this relates 
to the recent restructuring of the industry in New Zealand. Some of the reasons 
identified apply to any intervention by governn1ents in economic activity, some 
reasons and methods apply to public utilities in general, and some relate specifically 
to electricity. 
A Electricity 
The ready availability of electricity appears to be a sine qua non of contemporary 
civilised living. The adjustments that would be required to a life without electricity 
for business and for households are almost unimaginably large. 
Electricity is not defined in any New Zealand legislation, but the agreed statement of 
facts in a 1998 case included the following definition noted by Neazor J: "Electricity 
is a form of energy consisting of a current of charged electrons transmitted along or 
through conductors (such as wires) from, in simplistic terms, the point of generation 
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to the point of use .. . ". 1 A simple scientific definition is that electric current in a metal 
wire is "a flow of free electrons".2 Because the media along which electricity is 
transmitted are not perfect conductors, some of the electricity is converted to heat and 
is therefore unavailable for useful work. 
The electricity industry is normally divided into four functional levels : generation, 
transmission, distribution and retailing. 
Generation involves the use of a moving fluid, such as water, steam, gas or the wind, 
to tum a rotor. The mechanical energy that is produced is used to whirl magnets past 
stationary coils of wire, thereby generating electricity. The machine that "changes 
the kinetic energy ( energy of movement) of a fluid into mechanical energy"3 is a 
turbine. Where steam is used to drive a turbine, the steam can be produced from coal 
or oil, or by a nuclear reactor. (Small generators can be driven by diesel or petrol 
motors. Electricity can also be produced by solar cells, which convert sunlight into 
electricity, and by batteries, which convert chemical energy into electricity.) 
Transmission is the process of moving the electricity at a high voltage through cables, 
from the point of generation to a location where the voltage is broken down by a 
transfom1er to a lower voltage. As "consumers and power stations are scattered 
around the country .. . the transmission system is a means of interconnection as well as 
transport." 4 
Distribution is effected though a network of wires that run from the point the 
electricity was received from the operator of the transmission system, to the 
individual business or household. Further transformers are required to lower the 
voltage to that required by users. 
1 Elech·icity Supply Association of New Zealand Incorporated v Corrunerce Corrunission & Anor 
[1998] 6 NZBLC 
2 Th e World Book Encyclopaedia Volume 6 (Chicago, 1985) 150 
3 The World Book En cyclopaedia Vo lume J 9 (Chicago, 1985) 406 
4 Ministerial lnquily into the Electricity Jndush y - Issues Paper, February 2000, 11 
5 
Retailing is the process of selling electricity to the end user. As noted below, 'pure' 
retailing of electricity, that is, without any vertical integration to distribution or other 
functional levels, has been possible only relatively recently. A retailer who has access 
to a supply of electricity requires a contrach1al arrangement with the distribution 
company serving the region in which the customer is located allowing the use of the 
lines, and access to a meter at the customer's premises. In New Zealand the 'deemed 
profiling' system was introduced on 1 April 1999. This system uses average prices 
that relate the wholesale price for each half-hour slot to the price paid by consumers. 
This system allows competition to take place for small consumers for whom the 
technically possible alternative of installing a time of use meter would be 
uneconomic. 
Functional levels may be combined within an organisation, and not all levels 
necessarily exist in particular circumstances. For example, if a large manufacturer 
generated all of its own electricity requirements at the point of use, only the first 
stage, generation, would exist. A small number of very large users in New Zealand, 
such as the Comalco aluminium smelter, are connected directly to the national 
transmission grid, so that the distribution networks and the services of retailers are not 
used. Another possible variation is for generating stations to direct their supply into a 
distribution network, a structure described as 'embedded' generation. 
As the Issues Paper for the New Zealand Ministerial Inquiry noted, there are two 
broad contractual structures by which most electricity consumers obtain their 
supply.s The traditional one, (the 'interposed' option), has been that the supplier 
offers the use of distribution lines, and the electricity itself, as a bundled service. The 
other and more recent approach, (the 'conveyance' option), is where the consumer 
and the retailer each have contractual arrangements with the operator of the 
distribution lines. 
5 Ministerial Inquiry Issues Paper, above n 4, 21 
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B Government Intervention 
A government could intervene in any industry by directly participating in it (through 
establishing an enterprise, or by acquiring an existing enterprise), or by introducing 
legislation that limits the ability of firms to make economic decisions. 
In addition to actions or legislation that might be seen as targeting a specific industry, 
or business activity in general, business enterprises are subject to the application of 
the panoply of the generic laws of a state. Many laws have the effect of limiting the 
use of economic power by firms, and provide penalties for proscribed conduct. It is 
well established that corporations are subject to criminal law. 
An article published by the OECD outlined four tasks which were seen as "typically 
needing careful attention during and after the transition from government ownership 
or heavy regulation to much greater reliance on market forces"6. These categories, 
which are listed below, are relevant to the current situation in New Zealand of the 
electricity industry. 
• "competition protection" - controlling anti-competitive conduct and mergers; 
• "access regulation" - ensuring non-discriminatory access to necessary 
inputs, especially network infrastructures; 
• "economic regulation" - adopting cost based measures to control monopoly 
pricing; and 
• "technical regulation" - setting and monitoring standards so as to assure 
compatibility and to address privacy, safety, an environmental protection 
concerns. 
This paper examines the legislation which is directed specifically at the electricity 
industry, or which impacts heavily on it. 
6 Gary Hewitt "The Relationship between Competition and Regulatory Authorities" (1999) Yol l 
No 3, OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy 169, 172 
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II REASONS FOR INTERVENTION 
Why do governments intervene to limit the economic power of firms in any industry? 
A general explanation appears to be that it is because the government taking the 
action does not like the result that market activity has produced, or may produce, and 
it considers that an outcome that is more desirable in some respect is attainable. 
A Economic, Social and Political Reasons for Intervention 
Two economists, Lipsey and Chrystal, 7 defined two groups of reasons for 
intervention. The first group is described as attempts to remedy "market failure", 
which they defined as a situation where "the best attainable outcome has not been 
achieved" as a result of one or more of five types of causes: monopoly power, 
externalities, absence of property rights, public goods and information asymmetries.s 
The second group comprised actions designed to offset a "failure to achieve other 
social goals". The causes of these failures identified by the authors were: 
unsatisfactory income distribution, protecting individuals from others, paternalism 
and fulfilling social obligations.9 
Zajac describes positive theories in terms of the theory of public choice, and ofrent 
seeking, and he considers that the standard tools of economic analysis can be useful in 
applying these concepts. ,a 
In his discussion of normative theories, Zajac suggests that attempts "to rectify or cure 
perceived market failures" are the basis for most government intervention.11 He gives 
monopoly, externalities and lack of information as the reasons for such market 
failures.12 The other "standard" reason he provides is that of finding "economically 
efficient methods of redistributing income". 
7 Richard G Lipsey and K Alec Chrystal An Introduction to Positive Economics (Oxford University 
Press, 1995) 
8 Lipsey and Chrystal, above n *, 418 
9 Lipsey and Chrystal, above n *, 422-424 
10 Edward E Zajac, Political Economy of Fairness (The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1996) 148+ 11 
Zajac, above n 10, 148 - 153 
12 Zajac, above n 10, 157 - 166 
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The electricity industry is one of a group of industries, which are generally defined as 
'utilities'. Bollard and Pickford 13 found that such industries usually exhibit two 
characteristics. One is that their supply involves "a network of cables, pipes or other 
facilities which tend to enjoy such large-scale economies as to become natural 
monopolies".14 The other is that "since the service they provide is often regarded as 
an 'essential' input to other industries, the efficiency of utilities has a widespread 
impact on the efficiency of other finns".1s Bollard and Pickford noted a further 
characteristic in New Zealand (and in some other countries) that "historically the 
social importance of such industries, and doubts about their ability to function in 
competitive markets, have resulted in a history of public ownership.16 
All three of the characteristics identified by Bollard and Pickford appear to have had a 
substantial impact on government intervention in the electricity industry ever since 
electric power was introduced in New Zealand. 
For electricity, monopoly, and specifically 'natural monopoly' in parts of its structure 
is an influential reason for government intervention. In New Zealand, the functions 
for which natural monopolies may exist involve two types of lines: the high tension 
lines used to transmit electricity from the generating station to the point where the 
current is transformed to a lower voltage, and the lines used from that point for 
distribution to households and conm1ercial and industrial users. 
Such characteristics of electricity markets are not confined to New Zealand. Gellhom 
and Pierce describe the generation of electricity as a classic example of "economies of 
scale ... available up to a very large output leve1''11, and the local distribution of 
electricity as a classic example of natural monopoly.1 s 
13 Alan Bollard and Michael Pickford "The New Zealand Solution: An Appraisal" in M Beesley (ed) 
Regulating Utilities: broadening the debate (The Institute of Economic Affairs and The London 
Business School, London, 1997) 
14 Bollard and Pickford, above n 13, 93 
15 Bollard and Pickford, above n 13, 93 - 94 
16 Bollard and Pickford, above n 13, 94 
17 Ernest Gellhorn and Richard J Pierce Jr Regulated Industries (West Publishing, St Paul, Minn, 
1987) 10 
18 Gellhorn and Pierce, above n 17, 45 
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Zajac notes that, while economies of scale were earlier considered sufficient to 
determine whether a market was a natural monopoly, the concept of contestability has 
caused the focus to change to the role of sunk costs. 19 He suggests that if sunk costs 
are large, there may be a case for regulation. If they are not, the existence of even 
substantial economies of scale might not justify regulation. 20 
The concepts of economies of scale that could lead to natural monopolies, of pricing 
in a competitive industry and of pricing by a monopolist can be illustrated in three 
representative graphs. These are shown below. 
1 Natural monopoly 
The graph at the top of page 10 shows the hypothetical cost structure for an industry. 
The curve labelled 'D' shows the demand for the industry's product, that is the 
quantity that consumers in aggregate will demand at any given price. The AC curve 
shows the average cost of producing the industry's output, while the MC curve shows 
the marginal cost, that is the cost of producing an additional unit at any given 
level of output. The shapes of the MC and AC curves, that is, they are falling over an 
extended range of output and then rising, are representative patterns of cost behaviour. 
In this graph, the marginal cost continues to decline over a large range, up to point 
Q#. If the incumbent producer's output is less than Q3, say Q2, and a new firm 
enters with a production of Ql , the new firm's costs would be much higher than those 
of the original finn. The latter can expand its output, and sell it profitably at a much 
lower price than the new firm, thereby forcing it from the market. 
19 Zajac, above n 10, 32 
20 Zajac, above n I 0, 33 
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Price 
Output 
(1) Nah.a-·al Manopo/J. 
2 Competitive Industry 
The graph at the left on page 11 shows the standard representation of a competitive 
industry. Equilibrium, where the supply (S) and demand (D) curves intersect, is at a 
price of Pc and at an output of QC. This outcome results in a producer surplus (PS) 
and a consumer surplus (CS) equivalent to the two hatched areas. The consumer 
surplus represents the aggregate benefit consumers place on buying Qc at Ps, above 
the price paid. Consumers derive greater value from earlier units, so that the surplus 
declines as equilibrium is approached. Similarly, the producer surplus is the 
aggregate value producers obtaining above their costs of production, by selling Qc at 
the price of Pc. 
3 Monopoly 
As shown in the graph at the right on page 11, the most profitable position for a 
monopolist is produce Qm and to sell this at a price of Pm. The consumer surplus is 
greatly reduced. While some of the reduction has been taken by the monopolist, there 
11 
is a Joss of welfare the economy equivalent to the triangle ABC. This loss is called 
the 'dead weight loss' and it represents a misallocation of society's resources resulting 
from the absence of competition. 
Price 
Price 
p 
Ill 
D 
Qe Output Q,,. 
(2 ) Competitive Industry (3) Monopolist 
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B Problems with Intervention by Regulation 
It might be assumed that problems perceived to result from the absence of 
competition in the electricity industry (or in any other utility) could be remedied by 
the imposition of controls on prices and/or profits. It would be presumably implicit in 
such a view that this could be done in an objective and equitable way, and that there 
would be no perverse effects. Sentiments along these lines are often expressed by 
politicians and others. 
The reality is that the problem of designing a regulatory regime which will be of net 
benefit to the economy is far from straightforward, and that the net effect of any such 
regime is far from certain. 
As one newspaper commented succinctly and accurately, in relation to the New 
Zealand Ministerial Inquiry into Electricity, "Regulating monopolies isn't easy. You 
have to be cleverer than them, have more information than them and be incorruptible. 
You must also have nerves of steel." 21 
Bollard and Pickford identified a number of the problems involved in creating a 
regulatory regime, and concluded that they are 
... among Western economies, probably at their most acute in New Zealand, 
given the small size of the economy and the difficulty of gaining the 
economies of scale needed for the efficient operation of many utilities. In 
addition, the country's geographical isolation removes any possibility of 
international trade in utility services with adjoining countries.22 
The problems noted by Bollard and Pickford included structural features of the 
electricity that lead to small numbers of participants, and significant barriers to entry 
and exit that diminish competition. These include 
21 "What should we do? Er, ask the Commerce Commission" The Independent, Wellington, New 
Zealand, 21 June 2000 
22 Bollard and Pickford, above n *, 97 - 98 
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... substantial economies of scale, sometimes to the point of natural monopoly 
(such as with high voltage electricity transmission lines), economies of 
scope ... and large, lumpy, immobile investments in sunk assets (for 
example ... distribution networks ... ). Further regulatory problems are raised 
by networks and plants (such as hydro-electric dams) typically having low 
marginal costs of expanding output up to full capacity, but high fixed costs 
associated with that capacity; by the potential for substantial externalities, 
especially environmental (as in ... power stations); and in some cases, by 
inelastic demand curves (for instance, for electricity because of appliance 
ownership), which raise the gains from the exercise of market power. 23 
In addition, there are the more general problems faced by regulators. These result 
from the likelihood that target finns have a greater knowledge of their costs structures 
and accounting systems, and of the processes used in their industry and of its markets, 
than the regulators. If the regulator gets things wrong (a far more likely scenario than 
replicating the equivalent of a competitive outcome), and the price and/or profit 
allowed is too high, the target finn could be rewarded excessively or might not have 
adequate incentive to operate at the most efficient level. Conversely, if prices and 
allowed profits are set at too low a level, necessary inveshnent could be discouraged. 
In both scenarios, innovation might not receive sufficient attention. 
The USA has a long history ofregulation of the electricity industry, but this 
background has not prevented some significant conceptual problems in determining 
acceptable bases for setting prices. The resolution of such issues appears to involve 
involves a substantial element of subjectivity, and, consequently, in some cases 
different outcomes for similar issues in different states. 
Issues which have considered in the USA have included the question of how the cost 
of constructing capacity for future customers should be apportioned between existing 
and future customers, 24 and what utilities should be able to recover from the large 
sunk costs incurred for nuclear power plant projects which had appeared viable in the 
23 Bollard and Pickford, above n 13, 97 
24 Gellhorn and Pierce, above n 13, 116 
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planning stages, but which had been cancelled before completion. 2s Another issue 
is that of 'stranded assets". These are primarily generating plants for which the 
regulators have been allowing amortisation on the economic life of the plant as 
originally calculated, which have become obsolete through technical advances. The 
question is the equitable treatment of the unamortised balance of a plant which can no 
longer be used. Other disputes have concerned the appropriateness of using marginal 
cost over average costs in setting electricity prices,26 and the issue of whether utilities 
could take account of their customers' relative ability to pay in setting differential 
rates. 21 
Kuttner noted the problems created for the pricing models used by regulators in the 
USA during the 1970s, when inflation was high The cost of anti-pollution 
technologies was another pricing issue.2s 
In respect of the latter situation, Gellhorn and Pierce found "no consistent trend of 
agency and court decisions concerning the legal adequacy of relative ability to pay as 
a justification for rate differentials". They noted that in American Hoechester Corp v 
Dep 't of Public Utilities 29 the court rejected the argument "that a particularly low rate 
for electric service to the elderly poor constitutes undue discrimination". In contrast, 
the court found in Mountain States Legal Foundation v Colorado Public Utility 
Commission 30 that it was "unduly discriminatory" to have a "particularly low rate for 
electric service to poor residential customers". 
A further generic problem for regulators which has been identified only in recent 
years was reviewed Jenkinson and Mayer in relation to the experience in Britain. 
They found that many utilities had diversified away from their core businesses after 
25 Gellhorn and Pierce, above n 17, 11 7 
26 Gellhorn and Pierce, above n 17, 213 
27 Gellhorn and Pierce, above n 17, 192 
28 Robert Kuttner Eve,y thing for sale - the virtues and limitations of markets (Alfred A Knopf, New 
York, 1998) 236 
29 (1980 Mass.) American Hoechester Corp v Department of Public Utilities, 399 N.E.2d 1, 
from Gellhorn and Pierce, above n 17, 192 
30 (1979 Colo.) Mountain States Legal Foundation v Colorado Public Utility Commission, 590 P.2d 
495 , from Gellhorn and Pierce, above n 17, 192 
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they had been privatised, and that this raised concerns for regulators. One was that 
transactions between the different business activities of the utility might not be at 
arms-length prices. Another was that, if the utility was listed on the stock exchange, 
the value of interpreting trends in the utility's share prices as "indicators of whether 
regulation is unduly onerous or lax" was greatly reduced. The authors saw the 
acquisitions that had occurred as accentuating these problems. 31 
III HISTORICAL BACKGROUND -NEW ZEALAND 
A Introduction 
The New Zealand pattern was outlined concisely by Taggart, who observed that 
Until very recently in New Zealand, ... public utilities have been largely state-
established, owned and run. The fact of public ownership dispelled the need 
for regulation, as it ensured universal service at reasonable and uniform prices . 
. . . The movement from state ownership toward private ownership has raised 
important regulatory issues. 32 
The history of government intervention in the New Zealand electricity industry can be 
divided into three major three periods: 
• the early period, to about 1920, during which the state's dominant role in the 
industry emerged, although electricity was still far from being the major 
source of energy for households or industry; 
• the development of a mature system, from 1920 to 1984, as electricity became 
the principal energy source, with the state being virtually the only generator 
and local authorities being the monopoly distributors and retailers, and 
31 Tim Jenkinson and Colin Mayer "Regulation, Diversification and the Separate Listing of Utilities" 
in ME Beesley ( ed) Regulating Utilities: broadening the debate (The Institute of Economic Affairs 
and The London Business School, London, 1997) 292 - 294 
32 Michael Taggart "Public Utilities and Public Law" in Philip A Joseph (ed) Essays on the 
Constitution (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 214-215 
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• the continuing period of restructuring which followed the election of a Labour 
government in 1984. 
B Early Legislation: 1865 -1920 
Electricity was first used in New Zealand in 1861 for a privately owned telegraph line 
which ran between Dunedin and Port Chalmers. 33 Legislation quickly followed, in 
the form of the Electric Telegraph Act 1865. This Act "established a central 
government monopoly over the transmission of messages ... [and] became the basis of 
later government regulation of the burgeoning electricity industry".34 
While there are isolated cases in which electricity was used by manufacturing 
industries in the early years, lighting was the first significant application. The first 
use of electricity in a private house appears to have been in November 1882 when 
privately generated electricity was used, while the first use of electricity for street 
lights was in Reefton in August 1888.35 
As with telegraphy, legislation on electricity was introduced quickly. The Electric 
Lines Act 1884, which incorporated the Electric Telegraph Act 1865, covered both 
the use of electricity for lighting and for telephones. The rationale for the Act was "to 
ensure proper quality and care of installations ... [including] interference between 
adjacent telegraph ... telephone . . . and electric lines", but the Act also prohibited "the 
erection by private individuals or companies of lines for public supply without special 
legislation". 36 
The Municipal Corporations Act 1886 "helped promote the use of electricity for 
lighting". 37 In 1891, three private Acts were introduced to allow the development of 
electricity supply in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. The Acts gave each of 
the three city councils the right to purchase the generating plant after ten years. 
33 John E Martin (ed) People Politics and Power Stations (ECNZ and Historical Branch, Department 
oflntemal Affairs, Wellington, 1998) 15 
34 Martin, above n 33 , 15 
35 Martin, above n 33 , 22 
36 Martin , above n 33 , 18 
37 Martin, above n 33 , 25 
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The Auckland Act lapsed before being applied, because the required ratepayers' poll 
was not held. In 1889 Wellington became the first major centre to have a supply of 
electricity for public lighting.3s Several statutes were subsequently enacted to 
introduce similar provisions for other towns and cities. 
Other legislation laid the way for the government's later central role in the electricity 
industry. The Public Works Act 1882 and the Mining Act 1886 strengthened the 
government's place in the use of water resources, while the Electric Motive Power 
Act 1896 introduced a requirement that government permission be obtained to 
generate electricity or to use it for motive power.39 
The Water-power Act 1903 can be seen as the beginning of the coordinated 
development of hydro electric power.40 However, the Public Works Act 1908 was the 
first formal statement that the Crown was to have a key role in the construction of 
generating stations, the operation of these stations and the supply of electricity.41 
By 1917, nearly one in tlu·ee New Zealand homes was lit by electricity, but total 
electricity consumption was small because of its limited use by manufacturing and 
processing industries.42 
The Electric-power Boards Act 1918 was enacted with the purpose of extending the 
supply of electricity to rural districts, in effect by cross-subsidising rural users from 
the revenue gained from sales in urban areas.43 
By 1919, there were 64 supply authorities, with most (53) being operated by borough 
councils.44 There was no interco1mection between these supply authorities, and 
not all districts had an electricity supply.4s 
The Municipal Corporations Act 1920 took a different approach to the 1918 Act. "It 
gave municipalities the right to build stations and distribute electricity, and to transfer 
38 Martin, above n 33, 26 
39 Martin, above n 33 , 38 
40 Martin, above n 33 , 326 
41 Martin, above n 33, 41 
42 Martin, above n 33 , 67 
43 Martin, above n 33 , 70 
44 Martin, above n 33 , 71 
45 NM Speer Th e Electrical Supply !11dusfly in New Zealand (Electrical Supply Authorities 
Association of New Zealand, 1962) 61 
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funds from their profitable electricity departments to other activities .. . This 
encouraged local politicians to preserve their income-generating enterprises".46 
What forces drove the New Zealand Government to enact the early legislation 
outlined above, for what was then only a fledgling industry? 
One source of influence appears to have been British legislation that, for policy 
reasons, limited the opportunity for private sector development of the generation and 
supply of electricity. A concern for safety for this relatively new energy source no 
doubt played a part in relation to some issues. Of particular significance was the 
government' s desire to control water resources, and the importance placed on public 
works. Further, and strong, influences came for the policies of the Liberal 
Government that was in power from 1891 to 1912. This Government "acted in a 
strongly regulatory and paternalistic fashion"47 in many sectors of the economy. 
C A Mature System is Developed 
The use of electricity in New Zealand began to develop rapidly in the 1920s, and per 
capita consumption increased three and a half fold in the decade. It was "the 
beginning of the familiar pattern of demand outpacing supply that has existed until 
recent! y" .48 
During the 1920s and 1930s the Government undertook the construction of several 
hydro-electric stations on the Waikato River in the North Island, and in the South 
Island. 
Following the outbreak of the Second World War, the Electricity Emergency 
Regulations were issued under the Emergency Regulations Act 1939. These 
Regulations created the office of Electricity Controller, to whom wide powers were 
g1ven.49 
46 Martin, above n 33 , 73 
47 Martin, above n 33, 37 
48 Martin, above n 33, 123 
49 Martin, above, n 33, 128 
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A cause, which had many strong supporters over several years, the 'Save Manapouri 
Campaign', resulted in the Manapouri-Te Anau Development Amendment Act 1981, 
which set guidelines for lake levels.so 
Up to the mid-l 980s, the structure for the production and supply of electricity 
remained as it had been for a long time. The government generated almost all of New 
Zealand's electricity, transmitted it to 61 electricity supply authorities throughout the 
country, and it set the bulk supply price. A small number of very large users received 
direct supply from the government. The supply authorities, which were either 
divisions of territorial local authorities or ad hoe local authorities, had defined 
geographical boundaries within which they had both the right and the obligation to be 
the sole supplier of electricity. 
This structure meant that there was no competition in any part of the electricity 
industry. At the time this seemed to raise little or no disquiet among consumers. 
Presumably it was implicitly assumed that both the government and the supply 
authorities would act in the interest of consumers. The structure ofretail tariffs, 
which favoured households over commercial users, no doubt helped maintain this 
perception among the majority of the community. For industry, the cost of electricity 
was, with few exceptions, only a minor element of cost. This, together with the 
protected environment that then prevailed for most industries, might, in the writer's 
view account for the seemly passive attitude of industry. (A notable exception was 
the strong reaction from Comalco, the operator of the aluminium smelter at Bluff, 
whenever increases to its electricity price were proposed.) 
D Competition Emerges: the Changes since 1984 
1 New policy directions 
Following the election of a Labour Government in 1984, a broad and far reaching 
programme was initiated "to remove statutory barriers to competition, and to reduce 
the government's direct involvement in business activities".s1 Subsequent legislation 
50 Martin, above n 33 , 21 7 
51 New Zealand Official Yearbook 1998 (GP Publications, Wellington) 431 
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and policy decisions have impacted heavily on the electricity industry. 
The first indication that there would be substantial changes for the electricity industry 
was an announcement in 1986 that the government planned to reform its trading 
activities for electricity generation and transmission. In April 1987 the Electricity 
Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ) was established as a state owned enterprise 
(SOE) to operate the government's generation and transmission businesses. 
The Electricity Amendment Act 1987 removed the need for the Minister of Energy to 
approve hydro electricity generation proposals. 
In 1988, Transpower was fonned as a subsidiary of ECNZ to manage the transmission 
of electricity generated by ECNZ. In 1990 a Transpower Establishment Board was set 
up to plan for its separation from ECNZ. Initially a 'club' ownership of the 
transmission business by supply authorities and generators was favoured, but this 
approach was abandoned, and Transpower was set up as an SOE in April 1994 .. 
The Energy Companies Act 1992 required electricity supply businesses to be 
corporatised. 
While not a creature of legislation, the establislunent of a wholesale electricity market 
was a significant development in the structure of the industry. The market became 
fully operational in October 1996. 
In April 1998, the government announced a major package of measures designed to 
develop competition in the supply of electricity. Contact Energy Limited, which had 
been separated from ECNZ in 1996, was to be sold. ECNZ was to be split into three 
SOEs: Mighty River Power, Genesis Power and Meridian Energy. Ownership of the 
retail and lines businesses of the supply authorities would have to be split. 
Writing tlu·ee years before the Electricity Industry Refonn Act 1998, Taggart 
concluded that New Zealand was "unique in the extent to which public utilities have 
been deregulated and by the absence of any formal regulatory framework."52 
52 Taggart, above n 32, 214 
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2 The Commerce Act 1986 
The Commerce Act 1986 represented a major philosophical change from the 
relatively ineffectual Conunerce Act 1975 which it replaced, and it brought New 
Zealand into the mainstream of modem competition law. The 1986 Act introduced 
generic, but light-handed, measures to promote competition in the economy. The Act 
applies to all conduct in the course of trade, and there are few exceptions to its 
application. 
The electricity industry has been the subject of several investigations by the 
Commerce Commission, which enforces the Commerce Act. Several of these have 
involved adjudications, either where one electricity company sought clearance to 
acquire another in the industry, or for the authorisation of rules for electricity markets. 
The Commerce Commission has also investigated some allegations of anti-
competitive conduct in the industry. The major case in this category was the action 
initiated against Southpower Limited. This related to "the manner in which 
Southpower apportioned its costs between its line and energy business units, ad its 
anti-competitive contractual structure." The case was settled before the substantive 
hearing, "with Southpower paying $450,000 costs to the Commission and undertaking 
to reorganise its business structure ... " 53 
The Commerce Commission also enforces the Fair Trading Act 1986, a statute that, 
inter alia, prohibits false or misleading claims in connection with trade. The Act 
applies to the electricity industry, as to all other industries. On 4 September 2000, the 
Commerce Commission announced that Trust Power Limited had agreed that it risked 
breaching the Fair Trading Act in its advertisements that claimed the company was 
"the only electricity supply company which is predominantly New Zealand owned. 
The Conunission Chairman noted that in fact many electricity supply companies were 
100% New Zealand owned.54 
3 The Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998 (EJRA) 
The forced separation of dominant firms to allow competition to develop is not 
unknown in some jurisdictions, as the outcome of some high profile antitrust cases in 
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the USA demonstrate. However, the changes required of the electricity industry by 
EIRA appear unprecedented in New Zealand in terms of their scale and extent. 
Despite the extensive scope of the changes, and the speed with which the changes 
were introduced, they appear to have been accepted relatively calmly by the industry. 
As Patterson has noted, EIRA "and subsequent events have led to a reassessment of 
light-handed regulation".ss In Patterson's view, the forced separation of electricity 
distribution and retailing "was necessary only because light-handed regulation had 
failed, and the government was not prepared to introduce an access model along the 
lines developed in other jurisdictions".56 This seems a realistic conclusion. 
What did EIRA set out to do? The Act's purpose was to put downward pressure on 
costs and prices in the industry, and to give all categories on consumers the benefits of 
efficient electricity pricing. The Act also provided that the Electricity Corporation of 
New Zealand would be split into three independent but state-owned businesses, to 
remove the Corporation's dominance in generation. However, the major generating 
companies now also significant retailers of electricity. Previously, the Corporation 
and Contact Energy had been prohibited from undertaking this activity in terms of 
directions issued by the shareholding Ministers under section 13 of the State-Owned 
Enterprises Act. 
Subsections (1) and (2) of Section 2 of EIRA state: 
(1) The purpose of this Act is to refom1 the electricity industry to better ensure 
that -
(a) Costs and prices in the electricity industry are subject to sustained 
downward pressure; and 
(b) The benefits of efficient electricity pricing flow through to all 
classes of consumers -
by 
( c) Effectively separating electricity distribution from generation and 
retail: and 
( d) Promoting effective competition in electricity generation and retail. 
54 Commerce Commission media release of 4 September 2000 
55 Ross Patterson "Light-Handed Regulation in New Zealand Ten Years on" (1998) Competition and 
Consumer Law Journal 6(2) December 1998, 155 
56 Patterson, above n 55 , 153 
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(2) The particular purpose of Parts I to 5 (separation oflines and supply) is -
(a) To prohibit certain involvements in electricity lines businesses and 
electricity supply businesses which create incentives or 
opportunities -
(i) To inhibit competition in the electricity industry: 
or 
(ii) To cross-subsidise generation activities from electricity lines 
businesses: and 
(b) To restrict relationships between electricity lines businesses and 
electricity supply businesses which may otherwise not be at arms 
length. 
The effect of these provisions was to require that the assets of electricity supply 
companies be classified as either an electricity lines business or as an electricity 
supply business. A lines business is one which owns or operates electricity lines or 
related core assets, while a supply business sells or generates electricity. The Act 
prohibits a person who is involved in a lines business from involvement in a supply 
business. 
The Act required electricity businesses not owned by trusts to undertake corporate 
separation into lines and supply businesses by 1 April 1999, to then comply with the 
'arms ' length' rules, and to separate ownership fully by I January 2004. For trust-
owned electricity businesses, the Act allowed for the formation of a 'mirror trust' by I 
April 1999, with the lines and supply activities being operated as separate and 
independent businesses. Future ownership separation was not required for trust-
owned businesses. The purpose of separation was to allow competition in both 
generation and retailing. If vertical integration had continued, a new retailer would 
have had its ability to compete reduced if the incumbent company which owned the 
lines had cross-subsidised its retail prices from its lines revenues, or imposed other 
anti-competitive conditions. Similarly, if the incumbent's vertical integration also 
included generation, it would have the ability to reduce the ability of a new generator 
to sell its output by cross-subsidising its wholesale electricity price from its lines 
revenues. 
The outcome of the requirement that ownership and control of electricity distribution 
businesses be separated from generation and retailing was that most electricity 
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companies chos.e to remain in the natural monopoly business of distribution, and to 
sell their retailing and generation businesses. No trnst used the mirror trnst provision. 
Provision was made in the Act for the Commerce Commission to have responsibility 
for enforcing and monitoring some of the Act's sections. These responsibilities were: 
• To receive notices from exempt persons of any acquisition or increase in 
cross-involvements 
• To bring within the scope of the Act, or to exclude from the Act, an 
involvement that was otherwise exempt (by giving notice in the Gazette), and 
to maintain a register of these determinations 
• To provide general enforcement of the Act 
The Act provided that certain of the powers of the Commerce Commission contained 
in the Commerce Act 1986 would apply also to actions by the Commission under 
EIRA. These were: 
• Authority to use lay members in the High Court 
• The application of a civil standard of proof 
• Authority for seeking injunctions, for obtaining search warrants, for using 
section 98 notices ( ... ) and for the making of orders to protect the 
confidentiality of information 
• Allowing for the powers given to the Commerce Commission in EIRA to be 
delegated to Commission Members, and, a 
• Allowing for proceedings to be privileged. 
The Commission presented the following summary of its responsibilities under 
EIRA.s1 As the Commission noted, "Other Government agencies, including the 
Ministry of Commerce and the Inland Revenue Department, also have responsibilities 
for enforcing the EIR Act".ss The responsibilities of the Ministry of Commerce (now 
the Ministry of Economic Development) include the implementation of the 
information disclosure regime. 
25 
Sections of the EIRA Description of Responsibility Enforcement Adjudication 
imposing responsibility role Role 
17, 18,20 Part 2 Ownership Separation Rules # 
24 Part 2 Requirement for corporate # 
separation 
25 Part 2 Requirement for compliance with # 
arms' length rules 
30 Part 2 Ban on expansion in cross- # 
involvements 
35 Part 2 Expansion option requiring 
notification to Commission and # 
ownership separation by 1.7.99 
36 Part 2 Compliance process for existing # 
20% aggregates 
38,39,40 Part 2 Rules and compliance options for 
41, 42 mirror trusts and mirror co- # 
operatives 
45 Part 2 Trusts that cease to be mirror # 
trusts 
46 Part 2 No expansion of control by trust-
like agencies in electricity supply # 
except where section 44 applies) 
68 Part 5 Duty not to defeat purposes of # 
Parts 1 to 5 
80 Part 5 Extensions # 
81 Part 5 Exemptions # 
87 Part 5 Recommending regulations # 
In its adjudication role, the Co1m11ission had received 23 applications for exemptions 
in terms of section 81 by 1 September 2000.59 Most applicants were given 
exemptions, often on a temporary basis, and, in several cases. with conditions. Three 
applications were declined, and a similar number withdrawn. 
One category of applicants represented building owners, including AMP Asset 
Management New Zealand Limited and Colonial First State Property (NZ) Limited, 
who supplied electricity to their tenants. In such cases, the building owners were 
defined as being cross-involved in electricity lines and electricity supply businesses, 
because they owned the lines which conveyed electricity to their tenants, and acted as 
a retailer of electricity to them, a situation prohibited by the Act. It is not clear if this 
57 Adapted from Commerce Commission Practice Note No. 3, September 1998 (Revised August 1999) 
"Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998 Commission's Role and Processes" 4 
58 Commerce Commission Practice Note No 3, above n 57, 5 
59 Commerce Commission Public Register 
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situation had been envisaged when the Act was drafted, but the Commission's 
decisions on such applications did produce an outcome that allowed otherwise 
captive electricity users to have a choice of supplier. That is, exemptions were 
granted to the property-owning companies, which applied, subject to conditions 
designed to allow the tenants a choice of supplier. 
Tranz Rail Holdings Ltd and its subsidiaries had sought, and were granted, an 
exemption. The company's involvement with electricity included ownership oflines 
to supply its electric locomotives and lines on its inter-island ferries yards and 
buildings, the generation of electricity by North Island main trunk locomotives and 
the supply of electricity to the national grid, and the supply of electricity to the tenants 
of its buildings. The Commission found that granting an exemption would not impact 
on competition to more than a minimal extent.Go 
Another application for exemption was from an individual who was a director of both 
Auckland International Airport Limited and Meridian Energy Limited. The airport 
company was defined as an electricity supply business because of the electricity 
network it owned at the airport, while Meridan was an electricity retailer and 
generator. The Commission granted an exemption because it found that there was no 
business relationship between the two companies, and that the cross-directorship 
would not hinder competition in any electricity rnarket.61 
The Commission received and examined 32 notices from electricity supply companies 
on the expansion of their involvement in other electricity companies, in terms of 
section 35 of the EIRA 
To what extent has EIRA achieved its purposes? The separation of the activities of 
electricity companies appeared to go relatively smoothly, and in some respects well 
ahead of the timetable allowed in the Act. Competition has developed in retailing, 
following intense competition by the major companies (principally the four largest 
60 Commerce Commission Media Release 2000/30, 14 April 2000 
61 Commerce Commission, Media release 2000/31 , 17 April 2000 
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generating companies, TransAlta and Trustpower) to acquire the retail businesses 
offered for sale by the former electricity supply authorities. The framework of the 
industry is now one that may appear attractive to new entrants for generation. 
Sophisticated mechanisms now exist for the wholesaling of electricity. While the 
government's investment in the industry is still very large (including much of New 
Zealand's existing generation capacity, the transmission network, and part of the 
retailing function) , the government's role appears likely to diminish. It is now free of 
any obligation to be the provider of new generating capacity, for long one of its 
responsibilities. 
While EIRA has achieved much, the structure that resulted from it and from the other 
reforms of the industry, had some shortcomings, particularly in relation to the natural 
monopoly area of distribution, as subsequent developments, including the initiation of 
a ministerial inquiry, indicate. 
In May 1999, the government introduced The Commerce (Controlled Goods or 
Services) Amendment Bill, which was designed to fix prices or to set revenue caps for 
electricity distribution companies. As the then government did not have a majority in 
Parliament, and was unable to obtain sufficient support for the measure from other 
parties, the bill was not enacted. 
IV THE MINISTERIAL INQUIRY INTO THE 
ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
On 3 February 2000, the Minister of Energy announced a ministerial inquiry into the 
electricity industry, and set 12 June 2000 as the date for the Panel's final report. The 
target was met. 
A Terms of Reference 
The Minister's am1otmcement of the Inquiry noted the numerous changes in the 
electricity industry si nee the mid-1980s. The terms of reference given to the Inquiry 
Panel were to: 
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a. Assess the extent to which the current regulatory regime meets the 
Government's objective for electricity, with a focus on the matters for 
particular comment listed below. 
b. If the cunent arrangements do not achieve the government's objective for 
electricity, make recommendations for any amendments to policy and the 
regulatory framework that will assist in achieving the Government's objective. 
c. In developing recmmnendations, assess the costs and benefits of key options 
by reference to the Government's objective. 
d. In making this assessment take due regard of: 
(i) New Zealand's progress to date in the provision of electricity 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
(vii) 
(viii) 
(ix) 
services, including by comparison with progress made in other 
relevant countries; 
regulatory developments in other countries; 
relevant theoretical perspectives on the regulation of the electricity 
industry; 
the impact of new technologies; 
the impact of any options on investment in electricity infrastructure 
and services; 
environmental impacts; 
any factors specific to the New Zealand regulatory framework; 
any proposals for industry self-regulation; 
any proposals for changes to relevant legislation (such as the 
Commerce Act). 
e. Comment on the detailed implementation requirements of any 
recommendations, for example, any required legislation or regulations.62 
In addition, the Panel was asked to make particular comment on several issues 
relating to each of transmission and distribution, the wholesale market and retailing. 
A less measure, and more political, observation was made by the Minister in his 
comment that 
The instability and unce1iainty created by National's hasty and ill-conceived 
changes were both predictable and predicted ... Our objective with the inquiry 
is to ensure that electricity is delivered in an efficient, reliable and 
environmentally sustainable manner to all consumers.63 
B Recommendations made by the Inquiry Panel 
Given the breadth of the issues in its terms ofreference, it is not surprising that the 
Inquiry Panel's r·ecornmendations were numerous. There were 53 of them, numerous 
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of which included several elements. The recommendations were grouped into six 
categories: regulation, wholesale, transmission, distribution, retail and energy 
efficiency and the environment. A summary of the main points in the 
recommendations, and the writer ' s assessment of them, follows. 
1 Regulation 
The first recommendation listed six elements needed in the regulatory framework. 
While these elements may be unobjectionable individually, it is not clear that they are 
necessarily consistent. For example, "a heavily prescriptive approach" is to be 
avoided, but there must be "a strong assurance that the governments ... objectives will 
be met". If the government has an important policy objective which conflicts with the 
interests of the operators, it is not clear how this difference in viewpoint would be 
resolved. 
2 Wholesale 
The Inquiry concluded that the markets for financial instruments and for physical 
supply should be more clearly distinguished. It made no recommendations for the 
former, but several for the physical market, designed to increase competition. 
3 Transmission 
The recommendations on transmission centered around setting objectives for 
Transpower, to put more pressure on it to operate efficiently, given the absence of 
competition for this activity. The Inquiry recognised the potential for conflict 
between the multiple objectives it prescribed, and said that there should be "a 
reasonable and transparent balance" between "a fair return to the taxpayer" and the 
"fulfilment of the government's overall energy policy. 
4 Distribution 
The charges made by the lines companies have been one of the major areas of 
criticism arising from the present structure of the electricity industry. The Inquiry 
recommended that substantial powers be given to the Commerce Commission in two 
62 Jnqui,y into th e Electricity !11dust1 y - Report to th e Minister of Energy (June 2000) 66 - 67 
63 "Under the Microscope" The Ensign, Gore, New Zealand, 8 March 2000 
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broad areas. One was to make the Commission responsible for designing and 
enforcing information disclosure regulations, and for re-calculating asset values on a 
common basis. These elements recognised the limited value of the existing disclosure 
regulations, and the scope for lines companies to revalue their assets. The other was 
to give the Commission the power to impose price control on individual companies 
for periods of up to five years. 
5 Retail 
The Inquiry recommended that the industry should establish an Electricity 
Ombudsman scheme, and that it failed to do so within six months, the government 
should pursue other options. Another recommendation was that the Consumer 
Guarantees Act should be amended to apply to electricity, (a reflection of a 1998 case 
in which Neazor J found that, for the purposes of that Act, electricity is not a "good" 
or a "service, and that line function services are not "goods" or "services"). 64 
6 Energy efficiency/sustainability and the environment 
The four recommendations under this heading set a limit to the proportion of typical 
household electricity bills which should be for fixed network charges, and they 
outlined an approach to network connection charges and to co-generation proposals. 
With the possible exception of co-generation, the recommendations appear to have 
little connection with the heading of this category. 
C Reactions to the recommendations 
A few weeks after the Ministerial Inquiry's report was published, two economists, 
Simon Terry and Geoff Bertram, released a report which claimed that lines companies 
were overcharging consumers by $200 million a year. They attributed this to lines 
companies revaluing their assets, using the optimised deprival value (ODV) method, 
and then increasing their charges on the basis of these values. Messrs Terry and 
Bertram said that the Inquiry was allowing the practice to continue, and they claimed 
that the use of revalued assets as a basis for setting charges is not permitted in either -
64 Electricity Supply Association of New Zealand f11c v Commerce Commission, above n 1 
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the United States or Britain. GS 
The chairman of the Inquiry, Mr Caygill, responded to the report by saying that 
allegations of overcharging had been considered, and that the Commerce Commission 
would "consider the appropriateness of this or any other [valuation] methodology".66 
The chief executive of the Electricity Networks Association asserted that the 
conclusions of Terry and Bertram were unfair because, when the networks had been 
owned by local authorities, the book values did not show all of the historic costs, and 
because the networks had not been required to operate on a commercial basis. He 
claimed that regulators in Australia allow the use of a method of valuing assets which 
is similar to ODV - "depreciated optimised replacement cost".67 
In the writer's view, it would be facile and dangerous to reach an immediate 
conclusion on the basis on which distribution network assets should be valued. Given 
the natural monopoly character of distribution, it is important to identify a path 
between over-rewarding the owners of the networks on the one hand, and allowing 
them a return which is sufficient to maintain and develop their networks and to 
provide a reasonable return on their investment on the other. Further study is needed 
to identify the extent to which the book values resulting from the accounting methods 
used by local authorities are inappropriate as a basis for future pricing, and to develop 
an equitable approach to making any adjustments found to be necessary. 
V OTHER JURS/DICTIONS 
A Australia 
The electricity industry in Australia has been restructured substantially in recent 
years. The moves to separate the functional levels in the industry and to encourage 
the development of competition show similarities to the changes that have been 
65 " Cost of power 'unfair ' claims report" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 12 July 2000 
66 "Power rip-off claim and blame" Evening Post, Wellington, New Zealand, 12 July 2000 
67 "Overcharging claim rej ected" New Zealand Herald, Auckland, New Zealand, 13 July 2000 
made in the New Zealand industry. However, apart from differences resulting from 
the separation of powers between the Federal and state governments under the 
32 
Australian Constitution, the process of change in Australia has involved regulation, 
including price controls on activities where competition did not exist, from the outset. 
As the generation and supply of electricity in Australia is organised on a state basis, 
restructuring has required negotiations between state governments, in addition to 
intra-state changes.68 The first significant step was an agreement by several state 
premiers in 1990-91 to create a wholesale electricity market covering eastern and 
southern Australia. This market, which is called the national electricity market 
(NEM) although it does not cover all of Australia, came into effect on 13 December 
1998. The electricity networks of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and 
the Australian Capital Territory are now physically linked, and Queensland is 
expected to be joined in 2001 or 2002. Western Australia, Tasmania and the Northern 
Territory are not part of the NEM, although Tasmania may become connected by a 
cable in Bass Strait. 
Within each of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia, the 
generating stations owned by the respective state governments have been divided into 
competing businesses. 
The transmission and distribution functions, which are recognised as natural 
monopolies, are subject to regulation that has the dual objectives of preventing 
monopoly pricing and of establishing rules for access by generators and retailers. 
Australia's competition agency, The Australian Competition and Consumer 
Cornn1ission (ACCC), has been made the economic regulator of electricity 
transmission in the National Electricity Market in terms of the National Electricity 
Code (NEC) and the transitional rules of the states. 
"The NEC requires the Commission to set a revenue cap with an incentive 
mechanism (such as CPI - X or some variant) for non-contestable 
68 The information in this section draws heavily on the article "What's happening in the electricity 
market" in ACCC Update, Canberra, Australia, June 1999, 8-9 
transmission network services. . .. The Cornn1ission is developing the 
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regulatory framework and released a draft Statement of Principles for the 
Regulation of Transmission Revenues (Regulatory Principles) in May 1999.69 
The first decisions made by the ACCC in terms of these provisions were on 21 
January 2000, when revenue caps were set for the New South Wales and ACT 
electricity transmission networks. These decisions set "the maximum revenue that 
Transgrid and Energy Australia may earn in providing non-contestable electricity 
transmission services ... (for) ... high voltage electricity".10 The calculation of the 
revenue cap includes allowances for operating and maintenance expenditure, 
insurance and taxes, depreciation and a return on capital. 
Retail competition is being introduced in five stages, starting with the largest 
consumers. These steps (some details of which vary a little in some state states) are: 
• Stage 1. 
• Stage 2 
• Stage 3 
• Stage 4 
• Stage 5 
Consumption over 40 GWH a year 
(e.g. hospitals and heavy manufacturers) 
Consumption over 4 GWH a year 
( e.g. commercial buildings) 
Consumption over 750 KWH a year 
( e.g. supemrnrkets) 
Consumption over 160 KWH a year 
(e.g. fast food restaurants) 
All consumers 
Stage 5 will be reached in January 2001 by New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland 
and the ACT, and by January 2003 in South Australia. 
Until Stage 5 is reached, distributors and retailers are given exclusive rights to supply 
specific geographic regions. Maximum retail prices will be imposed by the state and 
territory regulators during this period, but price control will be discontinued when all 
electricity consumers are contestable. 
69 "NSW and ACT Electricity Network Revenue Caps", ACCC Journal, Canberra, Australia, Issue 26, 
April 2000, 22 
70 ACCC Journal, above n 69, 22 
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Entry as a retailer requires a licence from a state or territory government. Generators 
are able to acquire retail licences allowing them to sell direct to large customers. 
B United States of America 
Most electricity sold in the United States is generated by privately owned companies. 
The balance is generated partly by federal government agencies (notably the 
Tennessee Valley Authority), by state government agencies, by power districts 
covering several counties, and by co-operative groups, particularly in rural areas. In 
the United States electricity and public utilities in general, have long been subject to 
regulation. According to Taggart 
Early on in America a coherent body of law developed under the rubric of 
public utilities . .. The defining characteristic of American public utilities law is 
the imposition at common law of duties to provide service to all, without 
discrimination, and at a reasonable price. This law flourished in a country 
where for the most pa1i, public utility companies have been privately owned.11 
As Kuttner observed, the regulation of utilities was often shared between the Federal 
Government and the states. He added that 
The federal courts made clear, beginning in 1877, that states did have the 
power to regulate prices and conditions of service for local. .. electric 
companies . . . As it evolved, state public-utility regulation computed the 
utility ' s cost structure, which became the "rate base" upon which was 
calculated a reasonable rate ofreturn.n 
In his review of the history of electricity pricing, Kuttner noted that, by the early 20
1
1, 
Century, most states had public utility commissions in operation to regulate the 
electricity companies.73 However, by the 1920s, the industry was practising 
71 Michael Taggart "Public Utilities and Public Law" in Philip A Joseph (ed) Essays on the 
Constitution (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 214 
72 Kuttner, above, n 28, 23 1 
73 Kuttner, above, n 28, 27 1 
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widespread avoidance of state regulations through the use of multi-state holding 
compames. 
Under President Roosevelt the Public Utility Holding Company Act 1935 provided 
for Federal regulation of utility holding companies. This Act "sharply contrained 
combinations among utilities, particularly across state borders".14 Roosevelt also 
promoted the development of electricity by public agencies, notably the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, and fostered the view that public power sources should be seen as 
providing a discipline on the private power system.75 
Other major Federal legislation included the Public Utilities Regulatory Power Act 
1978, which required electricity utilities to allow independent generators access to 
their lines networks, and the Energy Policy Act 1992. The latter "further stimulated 
independent generation by authorising a new category of essentially unregulated 
wholesale generating companies" and promoted the wholesale purchase of electricity 
among utilities ("wheeling") based on the view that increased competition would 
reduce prices.76 
These developments required action by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 
which began to issue rulings to bring about competition. The first of these was Order 
888, "which pem1itted a local utility in one part of the country to contract for electric 
power from a cheap generator in another part of the country ... (so that) ... those with 
high-cost power would no longer be able to block their low-cost competitors from 
getting to market."77 
Yergin and Stanislaw saw the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act as reflecting two 
conflicting responses to the breakdown of the 'regulatory compact', the long-standing 
arrangement under which each electricity industry "was given its monopoly franchise 
in exchange for a limited rate ofreturn and a very high degree of governmental 
oversight and regulation".n 
74 Kuttner, above n 28,27 1 
75 Kuttner, above n 28, 271 
76 Kuttner, above n 28, 272 
77 Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw The Commanding Heights (Simon & Schuster, New York, 
1998) 350 
78 Yergin and Stanislaw, above n 77,352 
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One response was 'more govenu11ent', that is, by state public-utility commissions 
applying more detailed controls to the utilities. The other was "a more radical 
response - based on the heretical thought that perhaps utilities, at least in many of 
their functions, were not natural monopolies".19 
According to Kuttner, electricity generators who were not utilities produced about 
seven percent of the total generated in the USA in 1998, and an increase to about one-
third was likely within ten years.so 
Kuttner pointed out that the practice of electricity regulators in the USA of applying 
regulation in the form of a permitted rate of return supported the idea of universal 
service. The utilities 
could maximise earnings only by maximising diffusion of service. They 
necessarily took advantage of scale economies, operating according to the core 
economic principle that increasing demand is associated with declining cost 
... This made cheaper economic power more widely available, and raised 
company eam111gs.s1 
Kuttner argues that there is no prim a facie case for suggesting that regulation of the 
electricity industry in the USA retarded its progress. While the industry was very 
substantially regulated, he found it to be among "the most dynamic" of USA 
industries in the 201h Century. It achieved average annual productivity growth over 50 
years of 5.5%, compared with the 1.7% for the economy as a whole. He found it 
"very hard to believe unregulated competition would have done better".s2 In his 
view, "paradoxically, the regulated environment encouraged risk" and it appeared 
that, for the USA, "dynamic efficiency was superior to allocative efficiency".83 
(' Allocative efficiency' is the concept which, if met, signifies "the allocation of 
resources to their highest value uses. s4" Allocative efficiency together with 
productive efficiency (producing without waste of resources) constitute 'economic 
79 Yergin and Stanislaw, above n 77, 350 
80 Kuttner, above n 28, 272 
81 Kuttner, above n 28, 226 
82 Kuttner, above n 28, 226 
83 Kuttner, above n 28, 270 
84 Neil T Skaggs and J Lon Carlson Microeconomics (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1996) 36 
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efficiency". 'Dynamic efficiency' refers to the efficiency of adaptation to changes in 
technology and other factors.) 
Kuttner suggested that 
In highly imperfect markets such as ... electric-power generation 
... opportunism, oligopoly and asymmetric bargaining power do not disappear. 
With new teclmology they simply take different forms. If left to private 
forces, the result typically frustrates both allocative efficiency and consumer 
sovereignty. Despite the persistent quest for the grail of a perfect, self-
regulating market, the need for ground rules never disappears.ss 
Other writers agree that, for a long period, the USA electricity industry achieved 
excellent results for users. Yergin and Stanislaw concluded that, while the industry 
was "conservative, slow-moving and cautious" with clear but rigid rules, it produced 
"an astonishing boon to customers" and to the economy from the 1930s to the 
1970s.86 They state that the real price of electricity fell from 37 cents a kilowatt-
hour in 1934 to about five cents in 1970, because "economies of scale worked". 
A recent article in The Economist 87 noted that California began deregulating its 
electricity industry in 1996, and that about half of the states of the USA have followed 
its example. However, while deregulation appears to have worked well in many of 
these states, there have been substantial problems in California. 
None of the promised benefits of cheaper power, more reliable supply or 
innovative services have yet materialised in the state, but unfamiliar devils 
such as price surges and brown-outs have. Since June, wholesale prices for 
electricity have increased by 270% over last year.ss 
The article noted that a paper by Stephen Littlechild, the former electricity regulator 
in Britain, argued that this problem was the result of needless inhibition of "the 
development ofretail competition" by the regulators in California. He noted that new 
85 Kuttner, above n 28, 227 
86 Yergin and Stanislaw, above n 77, 350 
87 "A shocking backlash" The Economist, London, 26 August 2000, 51 - 52 
88 The Economist, above n 87, 51 
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entrants had been burdened with "part of the cost of "stranded assets" built by 
incumbents", which prevented them from competing effectively.s9 The Economist 's 
article added that, although California' s electricity supply is tight, the state's 
environmental laws make generation an unattractive business prospect, and that the 
state deregulated electricity in a "murky and politicised way" which created 
uncertainty resulting a failure to build any new plants."90 
The Economist article suggested that the smoothness of the process of electricity 
deregulation in other countries could have been deceptive. 
California's reformers were also lulled into complacency by the apparent ease 
with which other markets had liberalised. Europe's deregulation, early on in 
Britain and Scandinavia and more recently across the rest of the European 
Union, has not resulted in reliability problems. But credit for that belongs not 
to European models ofrefonn, but rather to excess capacity. Europe's top-
heavy, state-dominated power sector has tended to "gold-plate" its assets 
(through higher tariffs paid by captive customers).91 
The Economist article asserted that the role of the electricity regulators in California is 
muddled. "Sometimes, as with price caps, they meddle arbitrarily. They also cling to 
old suspicions . .. And at other times, officials naively expect the market to sort out the 
problems of transition by itself '.92 "Companies will invest in generation only if the 
rules of the game are clear. In America, they seldom are."93 
C Elsewhere 
Moves to restructure the electricity industry to improve its efficiency are not confined 
to the developed world . For example, it was announced on 9 August 2000 that the 
Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), a state-owned organisation that 
holds monopoly rights to generate, import, transmit and supply electricity within the 
89 Th e Economist, above, n 87, 51 
90 The Economist, above 11 87, 51 - 52 
91 Th e Economist, above 11 87, 51 
92 Th e Economist, above n 87, 52 
93 "Charge ahead" Th e Economist, London 26 August 2000, 14 
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country, would be restructured. ZESA would be divided into seven state owned 
enterprises to unbundle its activities and to commercialise them. A regulatory 
authority would be created by a proposed Electricity Act, and the authority would be 
empowered to grant licences to companies wishing to enter the industry in 
competition with the state owned enterprises. A target of 2003 was set for the 
privatisation of the seven proposed state owned enterpriseS.94 
VI IS THERE A BETTER WAY? - CONCLUSIONS 
In attempting to answer the question of whether there is an ideal way to regulate 
electricity, or at least a way likely to lead to improved outcomes, it is necessary to 
ask what society is trying to achieve. There is no question about the need in all 
countries for technical regulation of the industry, to ensure the safe use of electricity 
and to provide for the compatibility of the supply system with the electrical apparatus 
likely to be used. The industry must be subject to all of the generic laws affecting 
business, including the law of contract, the laws affecting business organisation, and 
to competition and fair trading laws . 
For the electricity industry of a country to approach optimal economic efficiency, 
several ingredients are required. To the greatest extent possible, the results should be 
achieved through market forces. The structure should provide incentives to induce 
new investment, especially in generation, where this is required. The structure should 
also encourage innovation. It is important that there should be an absence of practices 
or structures that would prevent the system from achieving the economies possible 
from an integrated system. Where effective competition is not possible, because of 
the existence of natural monopolies, there must be a means of ensuring that prices are 
not excessive. The pricing structure should include the right incentives, that is, for 
example, if supply appears likely to exceed demand at any given time or for any given 
period, the price signals should encourage both a reduction in use and increase in, 
94 ZESA set to be unbundled into seven new companies", The Herald, Harare, Zimbabwe, 9 August 
2000 
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capacity. The framework should include the incentives which will ensure a very high 
degree ofreliability of supply that is, there should be little risk of 'black-outs" (total 
absence of supply) or of 'brown-outs' (a noticeable reduction in the strength of the 
supply. 
A society might have non-market objectives, which it wishes to accomplish through 
the markets for electricity, and, if so, these must be taken into account. For example, 
if it were considered to be important to provide electricity at low prices to low-income 
citizens by cross-subsidisation, rather than by making increased direct payments to 
those in this group, the organisational structures will need to be accommodate this. 
The existing organisational background of the industry varies between countries, and 
this might affect the choice of path to be followed. The steps may be different ifthere 
is substantial excess capacity than if supply is tight. 
The history of the electricity industry in New Zealand demonstrates the application of 
most of the possible fonns of intervention by governments. For much of our history, 
vi1iually all of the industry had been brought into existence by central and local 
governments which continued to own and operate them. Competition was prohibited 
by a system of legal monopolies. The restructuring of the industry from the mid-
1980s onwards included an unprecedented compulsory separation of the industry's 
functional levels, and a separation of the government's generating interests, as a way 
of fostering the development of competition for generation and retailing. In New 
Zealand now, achieving economic efficiency of the industry leading to the price and 
other benefits this could bring to users, is clearly the target of policy. 
While the forced restructuring has been radical in the New Zealand context, New 
Zealand is not unique in giving priority to the application of economic concepts to the 
industry, with the objective of increasing efficiency through fostering the 
development of competition in those parts of the industry where it appears possible. 
In New Zealand, the new structure has allowed competition to develop in retailing, 
and even the smallest consumers have a choice of supplier. The generation market is 
now open to entry. 
41 
The Commerce Act 1986 introduced a major change in the nature of New Zealand's 
competition law. While the Act is generic in its scope, the numerous mergers and 
ownership changes of electricity businesses which have been proposed or which have 
taken place in recent years, and the relative newness of the concept of competition in 
the electricity industry, have meant that the Act has had some effect on the structure 
of the industry. However, the effect on the industry's structure appears to have been 
a marginal one in comparison with the major impact of EIRA and of other industry-
specific measures. In terms of business conduct, the publicity which followed the 
Southpower case would have helped confirm to the industry that the industry is fully 
subject to the restrictive trade practices provisions of the Act. 
While it is too early to draw any firm conclusions on the extent to which the post-
EIRA structure of the electricity industry will benefit consumer welfare in New 
Zealand, there is reason to hope that the net effect will be positive. An analogy is 
provided in a cost-benefit analysis undertaken by Newbery and Pollitt in 1997. This 
showed that the privatisation and restructuring of the generation and transmission of 
electricity in Britain in 1990 had resulted in a permanent cost reduction of 5% a year, 
equivalent to an extra 40% return on assets.9s Newberry and Pollitt did not examine 
distribution and retailing. 
The New Zealand Government failed to accompany the enactment of the EIRA with 
some form of control over the pricing of the regional distributors, which are natural 
monopolies. This appears to have been a serious omission, although it was later one 
of the key tasks assigned to the Ministerial Inquiry initiated in February 2000. 
However, the Ministerial Inquiry did not come to a conclusion on how the natural 
monopolies should be prevented from charging excessively high prices, a position 
which attracted some criticism, and it proposed that the matter be passed to the 
Conunerce Commission for further study. The Inquiry might have failed to take a 
position because it was not convinced that regulation of prices would necessarily 
improve the distribution markets. Alternatively, its caution might have resulted from 
an awareness of the pitfal Is of regulation, of the great difficulty in regulating 
95 David M Newbery and Michael G Pollitt "The Restrncturing and Privatisation of Britain's CEBG -
was it worth it?" ( 1997) Yo! XLV, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 269 
42 
effectively, and of the likely costs of comprehensive regulation. Dnes has pointed 
out "a tendency among many writers on economic policy to ignore relevant 
constraints affecting a particular problem ... (including) ... the costs of corrective 
economic policy"%. 
At the time of writing, the Govenunent's response to the recommendations of the 
Inquiry Panel is awaited. However, if the benefits to electricity consumers 
presumably possible from the introduction of competition in generation and retailing 
are not to be significantly diminished, or even eliminated, by excessive pricing for 
electricity distribution, effective regulation of that functional level is required. The 
problem is that monopolies have the general characteristic that it is more profitable 
for a monopolist to produce a smaller output, and to charge higher prices, than would 
be the case in competitive markets . Further serious objections are that the pressure 
for productive efficiency which exists in a competitive market is blunted, and that 
innovation might be pursued less vigorously. 
As Newbery and Pollitt have pointed out, "regulation or public ownership is the only 
stable form of organisation for natural monopolies".97 As the tide has been away 
from public ownership for many years, and seems unlikely to be reversed in the 
foreseeable future, some form of regulation of distribution appears essential. 
The Ministerial Inquiry has proposed that extensive responsibility for regulating 
electricity should be placed on the Commerce Commission. It is not necessarily 
appropriate for the task of price control to be undertaken by a competition agency, 
and the issue of whether a separate regulator should be established appears to require. 
more scrutiny. 
The transmission market is also a natural monopoly, although its continued ownership 
of Transpower gives the government additional avenues of control. The fact that a 
monopoly is owned by a government which has benevolent intentions towards 
electricity users, is far from providing certainty that the outcome will necessarily be 
96 Antony W Dnes Th e Eco110111ics of Law (International Thomson Business Press, London, 1996) 7 
97 Newberry and Pol lit , above n 95 , 269 
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the optimal one for the economy. Government's advisers will need to be receptive to 
suggestions about the effectiveness of Transpower's operations, and to possible 
lessons from other countries on electricity transmission. As part of the separation of 
functional levels in the industry, Transpower is prohibited from generating electricity. 
However, it has been claimed that Transpower would be the best placed organisation 
to construct small-scale generating stations to optimise transmission costs.98 If this is 
fact an arguable case, the prohibition should be re-visited. 
Kuttner's view, that "at the end of the day, this industry remains a classic candidate 
for regulated competition"99 could be the right one for New Zealand, if this view is 
interpreted to mean that competition will be fostered in the sectors where it appears 
feasible and beneficial, that is, in generation and retailing, and that regulation is 
applied to the natural monopoly areas of transmission and distribution. Getting the 
method ofregulation right is an important and challenging task. 
98 New Zealand Herald, Auckland, ew Zealand, 25 April 2000 
99 Kuttner, above, n 28, 275 
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